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Violence in Osh
In June 2010, in the southern Kyrgyzstan city of Osh1, 
and in villages up to 25 kilometres from the city, six days 
of violence left more than 450 people dead. The majority 
were killed by gunshot according to a newly released 
and detailed chronology (NHC 2012: 193). Three quar-
ters of those who died were identified as Uzbek and one 
quarter as Kyrgyz. The violence came two months after the 
overthrow of President Bakiyev in a self-styled ‘revolu-
tion’ in Bishkek. The linkage between the April Bishkek 
and June Osh events is unclear, but it is likely that fol-
lowing Bakiyev’s departure from the country, a struggle 
for power and influence quickly took hold in the southern 
oblasts (regions), as politicians and other local strong men, 
drawing on private armies that thrived in the criminal 
underworld, vied to gain advantage using violence and 
intimidation (ICG 2010; KIC 2011; Mateeva et al. 2012).
The instability in Osh took on an overtly ethnic char-
acter as protagonists escalated the violence by bringing to 
the surface social and economic tensions that had for many 
decades strained relations between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek 
communities. Immediate issues included disagreements 
over land and housing allocation which each ‘community’ 
deemed discriminatory, the use of the Uzbek language in 
schools and other public places, and the setting of ethnic 
quotas in state employment. The ethnic or communal basis 
of these and other matters relating to resource allocation, 
representation in politics and policing in Osh, generated 
political discourses that employed deliberately divisive 
nationalist language. Uzbek commentators found evi-
dence of rising Kyrgyz nationalism in what were regarded 
as inflammatory newspaper articles, while Kyrgyz com-
mentators pointed to Uzbek songs with insulting lyrics.
The Kyrgyzstan military and police force was criticized 
for, at best, failing to be even-handed in its dealings with 
all the residents of the city, and at worst, standing by as 
gangs congregated to commit acts of violence directed at 
Uzbek mahallas (neighbourhoods) (KIC 2011). Though 
the official government report did not find evidence to 
support claims of official complicity in the violence (NCI 
2011), the International Crisis Group (ICG) was suffi-
ciently confident to describe the events as a ‘pogrom’ (ICG 
2010). Meanwhile Hanks (2011), disagreeing with the 
conclusion of the independent international commission of 
inquiry (KIC 2011), described the killings as ‘genocide’. 
Local politicians, in particular the Mayor of Osh, Melisbek 
Myrzakmatov, who is often described as an ‘ultra-nation-
alist’ and who has been criticized for maintaining authority 
through corruption and patronage networks (Hanks 2011: 
186), was accused of exploiting growing tensions in his 
city.
The impression that the violence, at its root, was the 
result of both past and present social and economic dis-
putes in which each population group harboured griev-
ances against the other, was reinforced by the use of 
certain insults. Urges to violence and writing on the walls 
included threatening messages in Kyrgyz and Russian 
such as ‘Uzbeks leave Kyrgyzstan, you have no business 
here’; ‘Death to Uzbeks’; and ‘Kyrgyz, come out, we are 
going to kill Sarts’ (NHC 2012: 48; 112-116).
The repeated use of ‘Sart’ as a pejorative term, recalled 
its adoption by the nineteenth century Tsarist colonizers 
as their preferred name for the entire settled population 
of Turkestan; its use, largely in the twentieth century, by 
Kyrgyz and Kazakh nomads as a slight directed at seden-
tary people who were deemed to ‘lack tribal attribution’ 
(Baldauf 1991: 79-80; Hirsch 2000: 221); and its deploy-
ment in the violence that occurred in 1990 in the town of 
Uzgen, also in Osh oblast, when ‘Hit, kill Sarts’ was heard 
being chanted among Kyrgyz gangs (Tishkov n.d.).
A ‘Sart nation’
Nineteenth century Russian Tsarists, through the blanket 
labelling of all non-nomadic populations as ‘Sart’, ele-
vated a contested (though widely used) descriptor into an 
official category, which in turn necessitated the compiling 
of a language, with the same name, to provide a cultural 
basis around which the envisaged ‘Sart nation’ could be 
united. Turkic-speakers in Tsarist Turkestan, who today 
would be described as Uzbek or Tajik, widely denounced 
as offensive the colonial use of the term and the pseudo-
nation it suggested. Some of the common stereotypes of 
‘Turkestani Sarts’ were repeated in Rickmer’s account of 
her 1907 expedition to Central Asia:
Apathy is the distinguishing characteristic of the Sart or native 
of Bokhara. Sometimes Tajik or Persian by origin, sometimes 
Usbeg, more often a mixture of both, his apathy is but little 
affected by the particular strain in his blood. Centuries of 
oppression, political and social, have made the Sart what he is, 
a creature incapable of action save under tremendous outside 
pressure. Of combined social action for a common end, he has 
not the most rudimentary idea, save in cases where his very 
existence obviously depends on it. (Rickmer 1907: 659).
‘Sart’ and delimitation
Following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Soviets in 
Central Asia joined local intellectuals in first denouncing, 
and then formally abolishing, the ‘imperialistic’ term. On 
national delimitation in the early to mid-1920s, with the 
new borders drawn, residents of Turkestan, Bukhara and 
Khorezm, liberated from the ‘Sart’ insult, were instead 
issued documents that assigned them to one or other of 
the equally created identities of Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, 
Kyrgyz or Kazakh. And in turn they were declared resi-
dents of the newly formed Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic 
(which initially incorporated the Tajik Autonomous 
Republic), of the Turkmen Republic, and following some 
initial confusion, as residents of the Kazakh or Kyrgyz 
Oblast (later Republic).
A significant number of those newly identified as Uzbek 
or Tajik found themselves living outside the borders of their 
assigned republic as minorities in one of the other territo-
ries. Through delimitation, therefore, the Kyrgyz Republic 
came to include large minorities of non-Kyrgyz who had 
been separated from their titular republics as a result of the 
new and often capriciously drawn borders, including some 
1. There were additional 
deaths in the city of Jalabad.
2. I am grateful to an 
anonymous reviewer for this 
form of words. Reported 
clashes between Kyrgyz 
villagers and minorities, 
including Meshketian Turks 
in Maevka on the outskirts 
of Bishkek in April 2010 
(Eurasianet 2012), and 
minorities from the Caucasus 
in December 2011, as well 
as Tajik villagers in the 
southwest in January 2012, 
have been linked to such 
perceived injustices and 
historical disparities between 
ethnic groups (Naumann 
2011: 123-125).
3. However, considerable 
tracts of land were returned to 
local authorities by families 
who could not manage the 
land and across the country, 
village councils are still 
dealing with disputes over 
land yet to be distributed.
4. For a detailed historical 
account of the processes 
of Sovietization and 
collectivization in the Kyrgyz 
Oblast between 1921 and 
1932 see Loring (2008).
5. Government data 
upon which the WFP (2010) 
analysis drew, did not directly 
support the argument that 
Kyrgyz areas had higher 
levels of food insecurity 
or vulnerability, for while 
the largest number of food 
insecure people were Kyrgyz 
(as the majority population), 
predominantly Uzbek areas 
in Osh oblast tended to be 
more food insecure than 
Kyrgyz areas, suggesting 
that poverty and hardship 
were experienced equally by 
Kyrgyz and Uzbek alike. 
‘Death to Sarts’
History, injustice and a complex insult in Central Asia
Fig. 1. ‘Sarts’, July 2010.
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in enclaves completely surrounded by Kyrgyz territory. It 
remained the case throughout the Soviet years, however, 
that the borders were either poorly defined (in particular 
the Tajik/Kyrgyz border), or were only lightly managed, 
thus allowing relatively free movement and reducing the 
sense of ‘strandedness’ among these minorities. The issue 
of residence and location grew in political significance fol-
lowing independence in 1991, in part as a result of the 
tighter enforcing of national borders.
Despite removing the term from the official Soviet 
lexicon, ‘Sart’ survived in the Kyrgyz Republic for some 
years after the creation of the new Central Asian Soviet 
states. Collective farms that were associated with partic-
ular minorities retained the ‘Sart’ title, for example ‘Sart-
Kalmyk’ in Karakol (Abdykarov et al. 1989: 114), and thus 
a term which was in common use to signify non-pastoral 
and settled communities, took on an enhanced political 
meaning at the confluence of collectivization, minority 
settlement in the 1930s, and ethnic deportations.
The Kyrgyz population were aware that under Stalin, 
nations and republics created by the Soviets had no guar-
antee of permanence, and entire republics could be and 
indeed were, removed from the Union map and their popu-
lations dispersed, imprisoned or killed (Conquest 1960). 
This existential threat hung over the small and vulner-
able Kyrgyz Republic that had felt the wrath of Stalin’s 
purges in 1938, just two years after its elevation to a Soviet 
Republic, when more than 150 members of the local cen-
tral committee were violently ‘purged’. The presence of 
deportees in the Republic, many of whom were assigned to 
collective farms across the country, was a reminder of this 
threat. The label ‘Sart’ exposed their status as: conquered 
victims, but as a result of their own untrustworthiness; 
rootless, in the sense that they had been moved around 
with ease and against their will; and it came to encapsulate 
also the fate of a people whose status in the new place was 
fixed, as impermanent. ‘Sart’, ironically, possessed a dual 
meaning that populations could be both sedentary while 
also displaced.
Collectivization, decollectivization and 
privatization
The complexity of the insult as daubed in paint on the 
houses of Uzbeks and yelled with menace from road junc-
tions in the 2010 riots in Osh, would likely have been lost 
on most of the rioters whose knowledge of Turkic, Tsarist 
and Soviet history was likely to be patchy. But the potency 
of the insult, suggesting foreignness and inferiority, and 
which underlined the vulnerability of a minority which felt 
under siege, could not have been mistaken in the Uzbek 
mahallas.
The pejorative use of ‘Sart’ connected the events in Osh 
to a certain narrative about collectivization, privatization, 
and a set of perceived historical grievances which fed 
into a current and increasingly potent nationalist political 
agenda. A narrative that, at its extreme portrays the Kyrgyz 
as predominantly, and at times exclusively, the victims of 
Soviet aggression, and minorities – whether European or 
indigenous Central Asian – as at best complacent benefi-
ciaries and at worst active collaborators in the oppression 
of the Kyrgyz. Flowing on from this narrative is a political 
argument that advocates relegating Kyrgyzstan’s minori-
ties and depriving them of certain rights or property at a 
time when national cohesion is severely strained2.
While the grievances underpinning such a political 
agenda have their roots in a particular reading of the his-
tory of Sovietization, they also draw on an interpretation 
of economic and political developments that have taken 
place since independence.
Privatization, according to the World Bank, was more 
extensive in Kyrgyzstan than in any other Central Asian 
nation, and by the end of the first decade of independence, 
Kyrgyzstan had dismantled almost all of its collective 
(kolkhozes) and state farms (sovkhozes) which previously 
dominated the agricultural economy, and through land pri-
vatization had ‘individualized’ ownership of 95 per cent 
of arable land in the country, putting small farmers and 
households in charge of food production (Lerman 2008: 
392-393; Lerman & Sedick 2009). Land privatization 
was achieved through the allocation of former collec-
tive farm land to in situ farm members and to others who 
had an association with a farm (such as teachers). Each 
family received a share of land, and other farm assets, 
that reflected the length of their association with the farm, 
their role on the farm, and family circumstances3; and the 
mechanics of land allocation was devolved to the farms via 
district level committees.
While decollectivization and privatization within farms 
was thus generally regarded as ‘just’, the wider policy 
decision to accept the Soviet demarcated kolkhoz and 
sovkhoz administrative and territorial units as the param-
eters for privatization and land allocation, was regarded 
by some as an injustice. Specifically, it was criticized as 
a policy that legitimized the acts of confiscation, expul-
sions and land settlement undertaken by the Soviets. 
The nationalist narrative suggests that while all popula-
tion groups in the Kyrgyz Republic – indigenous Central 
Asians as well as Russians and Europeans, deportees from 
the Caucasus and elsewhere in the Union – were treated 
harshly under collectivization, most acutely during the 
period of Stalin’s ‘total collectivization’ in the early 1930s 
with the hunger and repression it entailed, it was the titular 
population of ethnic Kyrgyz who were disproportionately 
disadvantaged.
The historical harms identified included the outlawing 
of pastoralism in the mid-1930s and its ending as a viable 
livelihood, achieved through the transfer of Kyrgyz pas-
toral lands to state ownership, the organized settlement of 
large areas of lower-lying and productive land by minority 
populations, the socializing of the country’s livestock, 
and the involuntary relocation of former pastoralists onto 
the newly created animal breeding and arable kolkhozes 
and sovkhozes4 (Naumann 2011: 123-125). Land reform, 
therefore, which as Sabates-Wheeler has stated, rather 
than appealing to ‘historical justice’ arguments about 
restitution (as happened in other former Soviet states) 
instead ‘found its rationale in the notion of distributional 
egalitarianism’ (2007: 1428). As such it was condemned 
for failing to address perceived historical injustices and 
came to be seen as the final stage of land confiscation and 
forced resettlement that first began under Tsarist rule in 
the nineteenth century, was continued under communism 
from the 1920s, and which was then given legal status 
by post-1991 privatization laws that were encouraged by 
Western accountancy firms, the World Bank and the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund).
Historical harm and contemporary hardship
It was a relatively short step to interweave this reading 
of Soviet and immediate post-Soviet history into the very 
real land and livelihood concerns of people across south-
eastern Kyrgyzstan in 2010. Political tensions in Osh in 
that summer had been heightened, as described above, by 
discontent over urban land allocation, the use of the Uzbek 
language, policing failure, and the struggle for power 
and influence which followed the deposing of President 
Bakiyev. However, underpinning these immediate issues 
were a set of underlying concerns rooted in broader and 
nationwide disputes about land ownership, dissatisfaction 
with the privatization programme and with the course of 
land redistribution. These tensions in turn were heightened 
by the effects of a decade-long cycle of declining crop pro-
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duction in which food insecurity had come to affect 55% 
of all households across Osh oblast in 2010, creating levels 
of insecurity and poverty that were considerably higher 
than elsewhere in Kyrgyzstan and which necessitated the 
distribution of international food aid (WFP 2010).
Rural food shortages, felt most intensely in households 
that had too little land and too few animals to satisfy 
household needs, according to the WFP were related to 
a decline in small farm wheat production and rising food 
prices. Against this background, and what Mateeva et al. 
described as ‘a logic (of rural and urban) collective inse-
curities’ (2012: 1), the use of ‘Sart’ was powerful, recalling 
historical injustices of land loss and hunger, particularly 
among those who felt that they had been deceived by pri-
vatization and decollectivization5.
Managing conflict and confronting history
Conley has argued that insults can be at once both ‘anti-
social’ (malign) and ‘constitutive of social relations’ 
(benign) (2010: 2-3). It would take an extreme optimist 
to interpret the use of ‘Sart’ by the perpetrators of the vio-
lence in the 2010 events as anything other than destructive. 
The insult advanced a radically simplified interpretation 
of Kyrgyzstan’s complex problems, portraying the situ-
ation as a straightforward conflict between the victim, 
‘non-Sarts’ (Kyrgyz, the majority ethnie, as people with a 
unique historical claim to the land and a nomadic people 
who fell victim to Soviet aggression) and the oppressors, 
‘Sarts’ (largely Uzbek, there only by historical accident, 
complicit in historical injustices, a minority both predatory 
and untrustworthy). The intent was to inflame a situation 
where inter-communal conflict was already undermining 
national reconciliation; a process which was itself in the 
hands of a government whose authority was challenged 
by increasing political factionalism and social disunity. 
The events had the effect, as Troitskiy noted, of turning 
‘a growing part of the country’s political elite (towards) 
a nationalist rhetoric’ thus driving nationalism into the 
mainstream of Kyrgyzstan’s political debate (2012: 25). In 
the city itself, and in the aftermath of the violence, Tucker 
(2012) has observed that Uzbeks, aware of the heightened 
risks of renewed conflict, made a number of concessions 
aimed at reconciliation; for example, accepting the shift 
from Uzbek to Kyrgyz language teaching in predomi-
nantly Uzbek schools. At the same time, he argues, in their 
everyday exchanges on the 2010 events, Uzbek residents 
of the city are actively neutralizing or ‘de-ethnicizing’ the 
causes of the violence by reconnecting with a specific 
‘Osh identity’ – one that captures the presence and coex-
istence in the city of Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and other minori-
ties over many generations – and rejecting the nationalist 
position that the violence was an outcome of an unbridge-
able divide between the city’s two main communities. In 
emphasizing an historic unity of the people of Osh, blame 
is being directed instead at outsiders; ‘people who came 
down from the mountains’, who were not ‘of us’, but were 
rather hotheads manipulated by external political actors 
and criminal interests.
The Kyrgyz government and the numerous international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations that 
are supporting efforts at conflict resolution and crisis man-
agement are fully aware of the domestic and international 
risks involved in engaging in debates about Sovietization, 
colonization, collectivization and its subsequent disman-
tling. In particular, of confronting those interpretations 
that place only Kyrgyz harm at the centre. The concentra-
tion on grass roots conflict resolution, cross-community 
communication, and improved mediation and dialogue, 
may go some way to providing an early warning of con-
flict such as that witnessed in Osh. However, tensions over 
land linked to perceptions of historical injustice which in 
turn are heightened by the experience of poverty, will 
increase the likelihood of future inter-communal tensions. 
The challenge for the government is to find a way of dis-
cussing the country’s Soviet past in a manner that allows 
for the emergence of alternative political narratives which 
support rather than undermine reconciliation. l
(from left to right)
Fig. 2. Graffiti indicating 
an Uzbek-owned property on 
the left, and a Kyrgyz-owned 
property on the right.
Fig. 3. ‘No Home for 
Sarts!’ written in Kyrgyz on 
a kerb stone in an Uzbek 
neighbourhood, June 2010.
Fig. 4. Uzbek elders, Osh, 
July 2010.
Fig. 5. Displaced family, 
Osh, July 2010.
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